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Introduction
During the past two decades, international fragmentation of production across locations by multinationals has become even more prevalent. Multinationals place different production phases of a product in different countries or regions, and set up a world wide fragmentation network.
Fragmentation is not accounted for in the new trade theory based on Dixit-Stiglitz preferences where all firms export because of consumers' love of variety and the assumption is that there is no fixed cost for exporting. Available Heterogeneous firms models present explanations for this phenomenon. The Melitz (2003) dynamic industry model with heterogeneous firms and fixed costs of exporting shows that exposure to trade induces only the more productive firms to enter export markets and simultaneously forces the least productive to exit. And among exporters, Melitz's model suggests that firms with higher productivity have greater sales. As a generalization on Melitz, Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) (hereinafter referred to as HMY) introduce horizontal FDI into Melitz's model, and focus on a firms' choice between exports and horizontal FDI. They concluded that the least productive firms serve only the domestic market, that relatively more productive firms export, and that the most productive firms engage in FDI. In HMY, at a sector level, the more within-industry dispersion of firm productivity, the lower the ratio of exports to FDI sales. There is, however still no fragmentation in this structure. This paper extends the HMY model, and analyzes the different ways multinational firms which have different productivity can serve the market abroad when product chains can also be internationally and arbitrarily fragmented. Besides exporting and horizontal FDI, firms face another choice which is to supply abroad through international fragmentation. In HMY, international fragmentation is absent， so firms only choose between exports and horizontal FDI to serve markets abroad. We first consider firms' choice when international fragmentation is possible but has a sole fixed cutoff point. We then analyze firms' choice when international fragmentation is possible but there are two possible fixed cutoff points; and lastly the situation when product chains can be arbitrarily fragmented.
The main conclusions are as the following: On exposure to trade, firms with the lowest productivity will exit, those with intermediate productivity will export, and those with higher productivity will choose fragmentation. Among these, the more productive a firm is the more of the production chains is allocated abroad. Firms with the highest productivity will choose horizontal FDI. At a sector level, the more prone a sector is to be fragmented, the lower the ratio of exports to FDI sales. One of the most significant findings is that the ability of a country to fragment production internationally is a source of comparative advantage.
The remainder of the paper is composed of four sections. The second is a literature review. In the third, we set up a model in which product chains can be arbitrarily fragmented and study the different choices of heterogeneous firms in supplying abroad. The last part is the conclusion.
Related Literature
This paper is related to two strands of literature, one on heterogeneous firms (Melitz (2003) , Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004)) ① . The other is fragmentation Hanson (1996, 1999) , Deardorff（2001）, Yamashita (2010)). The former is about the different choices of the firms with different productivity, and the latter focuses on the effect of fragmentation on factors' prices, employment and welfare. This paper is based on the HMY model, and the HMY model is based upon Brainard (1993) and Melitz (2003) . Here we briefly review these papers.
Brainard (1993) develops a "proximity-concentration" model to analyze the mode used by representative firms to supply abroad. In her study, there are two countries and two commodities. One is a homogenous product, and the other a differentiated product. The differentiated product sector is characterized by increasing returns at firm level since some inputs that have the characteristic of public goods, and scale economies at plant level so that concentrating production lowers unit costs.
There is also a variable transport cost that rises with distance so that investment abroad can save transport costs. The decision to supply abroad via export or horizontal FDI depends on the trade-off between proximity advantage and concentration advantage. When proximity advantage has predominance over concentration advantage, a two-way investment equilibrium will arise. In contrast, when concentration advantage has predominance over proximity advantage, there will be a two-way trade equilibrium. firms to enter the export market, the second most productive firms to serve only domestic market, and forces the least productive firms to exit.
To enter the market, firms must make an initial investment, and then draw their productivity from a common distribution. After firms know their productivity, they choose one of the following three choices: to exit, to supply the domestic market, or supply the domestic market and at the same time export. Firm needs to meet certain productivity requirements to make the two latter choices.
Melitz's model generates the following outcomes: Firms with high enough productivity can supply abroad via export because only these firms can afford the fixed export cost; exposure to trade forces the least productive firms to exit; market shares are reallocated toward more productive firms and contribute to an aggregate productivity increase. prices, employment and welfare. In a series of studies, Feenstra and Hanson develop a model that has the implication of an increase in outsourcing would lead to an increase in the relative wage of skilled labor in both the developed and the developing countries. In this paper, we don't concern the effect of fragmentation but the firms' mode to serve the market abroad.
Theoretical Model

Demand
We assume the world consists of N countries, each producing goods in H+1
sectors. H sectors produce differentiated products, and one sector produces a homogenous product which is the numeraire good. Labor is the sole factor of production, with country i endowed with i L units of labor.
A fraction of h β income is spent on differentiated products of sector h, the remaining fraction 1
is spent on the homogenous product. For a differentiated sector h, consumers have constant elasticity of substitution preferences.
Demand for the differentiated sector h is 
Supply
We assume that the sector that produces the homogenous product is competitive.
For simplicity, we assume every country has the same productivity in producing the homogenous product. There are no trade costs for the homogenous product in trade between countries. We assume h h β ∑ is small enough that every country produces the homogenous product and given competitive assumption and no trade costs the price is equal in every country. The price of the homogenous product is standardized so that the wage in every country is 1, and the total income of country i is Firms export the intermediates produced at home, and production abroad uses these intermediates ② . Though intermediates are introduced into the production and the whole of the production process is done in two nations, we assume this splitting does not affect a firm's production technology. This treatment appears in Table 2 and is further discussed later. the cutoff points are respectively 1 and 0 in these two cases. Here we focus on the Category 3 in most cases. 
To enter a sector h, potential entrants should pay a sunk entry cost of F E units of labor. Once the sunk entry cost is paid, a firm draws its labor-per-unit-output coefficient a from a distribution ( ) G a . Once a firm has observed its productivity, it will choose between exiting and producing. A firm remaining in the industry will always serve its domestic market through domestic production, but it may also serve the foreign market. If so, it can choose to access the foreign market via export, fragmentation or horizontal FDI. This choice is driven by a proximity-concentration trade-off as in earlier literature: the more production chains are allocated abroad, the more transport costs can be saved, but it induces higher fixed costs. After entry, producers engage in monopolistic competition. In equilibrium, one firm chooses only one way to serve the foreign market.
Firms remaining in the industry should choose one of the four categories listed in Table 1 . The fixed cost and the marginal cost of each category are indicated in Table   2 . For all these four categories, we assume that there exists a fixed cost of The marginal cost of the commodity supplied to home for all four categories is a , since these firms always supply the home market via the domestically produced commodity. We next assume that there exist iceberg transportation costs for both the final commodity and the intermediates, which means τ units need to be exported for 1 unit to arrive ① . The marginal cost of the commodity supplied abroad by firms in Category 2 is thus a τ . For firms in Category 3, the marginal cost of the commodity supplied abroad consists of three parts, the first is sa that is incurred at home, the Under an assumption of CES preferences, firms will maximize their profits by setting the price as a markup over marginal cost. Here, the markup factor is /( 1) 1
For firms in Category 3, the firm with labor-per-unit-output coefficient a will sell the commodity at home at the price of ( ) 
Choiced mode to serve the abroad market
We consider a firm with the labor-per-unit-output a in sector h in country i.
After it observes its labor-per-unit-output as a , if it chooses to produce commodity, it will obtain profit i D π from home production. Under the assumption of equal demands between country i and country j, from (1), (3) and (4) Under these assumptions, from Figure 1 , we can see
and firms with productivity index below π that is included in Figure   1 .
From (2), (3) and (4), we can see that the intercept (4) When product chains can be arbitrarily fragmented
Under the circumstances of international fragmentation, the more productive a firm is, the more product chains will be allocated abroad. This conclusion follows since: if the cutoff point could be an arbitrary number over (0, 1), in this ideal circumstances, the dashed in Figure 3 would become a smooth curve that is convex to the origin. The more productive a firm is, the more profit it will abtain. Firms with the lowest productivity will exit, and those with lower productivity will choose export.
Firms with higher productivity will choose fragmentation, among which, the more productive a firm is, the more product chains are allocated at abroad. Firms with the highest productivity will choose the horizontal FDI. With an increase in the numbers of possible cutoff points, the proportion of firms that choose fragmentation will increase, and the proportion of firms that choose exporting and horizontal FDI will decrease.
Equilibrium
In equilibrium, for country i, The free entry condition is:
The first item on the left side of (9) is the expected profit gained from the domestic market i when a potential entrant's labor-per-unit-output is less than i D a . The second item on the left side of (9) is the expected profit gained from country j when a potential entrant's labor-per-unit-output is less than ij X a . (9) means that the expected profit is equal to the sunk entry cost F E , which implies a zero expected profit for a potential entrant.
Firms that supply abroad via fragmentation FDI will choose such an s that they can make the highest profit. So, from (2), we can get 
The ratio of exports to FDI at the sector level
Next we examine let's look at the ratio of export to FDI for country i supplying country j at a sector level. Here FDI include horizontal FDI and fragmentation FDI.
When product chains can be arbitrarily fragmented, from Figure 3 nearly all the firms supply abroad via fragmentation FDI and few firms choose export and horizontal FDI.
In reality, product chains of a commodity may not be arbitrarily fragmented, which will mean that cutoff points firms can choose are limited.
From Figure 3 it follows that at the sector level, the more prone to be fragmented a sector is, the lower the ratio of exports to FDI sales is. The significance of this is that it suggests that the ability of a country to fragment product internationally is one of the origins of comparative advantage. A country that has a lower ability in fragmenting product internationally will have comparative advantage in this sector.
At a sector level, the ratio of export to FDI for country i to supply country j is From (2) and (3) is, and hence the smaller is the ratio of export to FDI.
Also at a sector level, the higher the transportation costs are, or the smaller the fixed cost for setting up a plant is, or the smaller the fixed cost for selling products abroad is, the lower the ratio of exports to FDI sales is. This extends the Proximity-Concentration model of Brainard (1993) in two ways. One is from the firm level to a sector level. The other is that the definition of FDI is extended to include horizontal FDI and fragmentation FDI.
Concluding remarks
This paper builds on the HMY model to analyze different ways for multinational firms which have different productivity to serve the market abroad when product chains can be arbitrarily fragmented. Fragmentation is captured through the splitting of production chains across countries to yield a proximity advantage as in Brainard (1993) , but with a fixed cost of fragmentation production in foreign countries.
The analysis generalizes HMY by suggesting that while firms with the lowest productivity will exit, and those with lower productivity will choose to export, and those with higher productivity will choose fragmentation, among which, the more productive a firm is, the more product chains are allocated at abroad. Firms with the highest productivity will then choose horizontal FDI as in HMY. At a sector level, the more prone to be fragmented is an industry, the lower the ratio of exports to FDI sales is. Also at a sector level, the higher are transportation costs, or the smaller the fixed cost for setting up a plant, or the smaller the fixed cost for selling products abroad, the lower the ratio of exports to FDI sales.
By introducing fragmentation into the HMY model, this paper looks at the choices of heterogeneous firms in supplying the market abroad in a product fragmentation world. When product chains can be arbitrarily fragmented, for the firms who choose fragmentation, the more productive a firm is, the more product chains are allocated at abroad. This suggests that the "proximity-concentration" hypothesis developed by Brainard (1993) can be applied even when product fragmentation occurs. For firms who choose fragmentation FDI, because more product chains allocated abroad incur more fixed costs, only more productive firms can allocate more product chains abroad.
One important implication of this paper is that the ability of a country to fragment product internationally is a source of comparative advantage. At a sector level, the more prone for an industry to be fragmented, the lower the ratio of exports to FDI sales. For any sector, the country that has the most ability relative to others to fragment production internationally is more likely to supply markets abroad via fragmentation. Equally, this country will export fewer commodities for this sector;
and the country that has less ability to fragment a product internationally is more likely to export.
